The new normal : economists ponder whether the "natural" rate of unemployment has risen by Renee Courtois
M
any economists believe that the recent recession
is technically over. But it may not feel that way
on  Main  Street.  This  recession  brought  the
largest post-war upswing in the unemployment rate, rising
from a pre-recession low of 4.4 percent to about 10 percent
in recent months. Many economists predict a “jobless
recovery,” in which gross domestic product — the fore-
most measure of the economy’s overall output — rises, 
but employment continues to fall or remains stagnant. 
Is some of this unemployment here to stay?
Economists often speak of a “natural” rate of unemploy-
ment  that  the  economy  will  gravitate  to  after  working
through  business  cycle  fluctuations. There  will  always  be
some  positive  level  of  unemployment.  Firms  continually 
create and destroy jobs in response to supply and demand
conditions. Moreover, at any given time some industries are
declining while others are expanding. The supply of labor,
too,  changes  with  people  graduating,  retiring,  moving
between jobs, and choosing to work more or less throughout
their lives, and it can take time for job seekers to locate
opportunities. 
The natural rate of unemployment — or, conversely, the
level of “full employment” — is the rate that exists due to
this constant churning even when the economy is running
smoothly. Before the recession, the Congressional Budget
Office, which produces the most widely used estimate of the
natural rate, judged it to be about 5 percent. A current unem-
ployment rate of almost double that implies the economy
has a long way to go before reaching full employment. But if
the natural rate has risen, as some economists suspect, then
we may not expect unemployment to fall anytime soon to
the low levels seen before the recession.
A Moving Target for Policy
Promoting  employment  is  half  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
mandated  policy  objective.  But  when  unemployment  is
especially low, labor markets are tight and that puts upward
pressure  on  wages  and,  therefore,  inflation. This  poses  a
problem  for  price  stability,  the  other  half  of  the  Fed’s 
mandate. In general, the Fed’s monetary policy tools push
inflation  and  unemployment  in  opposite  directions. This
inverse trade-off reflects the famed Phillips curve. 
To  know  what  level  of  unemployment  the  Fed  can 
reasonably expect to achieve without igniting inflation, Fed
policymakers  must  have  in  mind  some  estimate  of  the 
natural rate. This is a challenge because the natural rate is
not an observable statistic — it must be inferred from other
data — and it changes over time. The natural rate is deter-
mined  by  features  of  the  economy  that  are  more  or  less
permanent,  like  the  flexibility  of  labor  markets  and  the 
policies and laws that affect it.
Though these are usually deeply embedded features of an
economy that change slowly over time, this doesn’t mean we
should too easily assume the current natural rate will remain
the status quo. “The medium term natural unemployment
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BY   R E N E E   C O U RTO I Ssays Edmund Phelps of Columbia University who won the
2006 Nobel Prize in economics in part for his work on the
natural rate. For example, he says the natural rate is partly a
function of the values that entrepreneurs and investors put
on business assets. “If that takes a jump, your best guess
about  the  medium  term  natural  unemployment  rate 
takes a jump too,” and the actual unemployment rate will
eventually follow. Perhaps the best example of this was in
the late 1990s tech boom that endowed the economy with
lasting productivity gains and, as a result, arguably lowered
the natural rate of unemployment. But it is hard to defini-
tively know in real time whether the natural rate is changing.
Some economists, such as Stanford University’s Robert Hall,
have gone as far as suggesting that the natural rate is too
variable to be useful in policymaking. 
The Phillips Curve relationship, too, is far from stable.
When it was first documented by New Zealand economist
A.W.  Phillips  in  1958,  economists  initially  believed  the 
relationship  presented  a  relatively  simple  trade-off  for 
policymakers: If low unemployment was the priority, they
could “buy” it in each period by printing money (or, similar-
ly, through fiscal expansion), fooling employers into thinking
demand for their products had increased, leading them to
hire more workers. This meshed well with the Keynesian
view of the day that endorsed the government’s ability to
manage demand to produce high employment.
But such a policy trade-off was too simple to be true since
it would rely on tricking people indefinitely, as Phelps and
Milton Friedman, also a Nobel laureate, pointed out in their
respective  research  during  the  1960s.  Eventually,  people
would figure out that the boost in demand was only an illu-
sion created by the increased money supply. Workers would
be unwilling to work at their old wages since inflation had
eroded their purchasing power, and nominal wages would
have to rise at a magnitude equal to the increase in inflation,
bringing unemployment back up to the natural rate. In the
medium run — a period long enough for the economy to go
through this learning process — the result of this attempt at
expansion would be a higher price level with no change in
any “real” economic variable like unemployment or produc-
tion. “The natural unemployment rate idea is all about how
demand doesn’t matter in the long run,” says Phelps.
Moreover, the inflation trick would only boost employ-
ment  once  or  twice  before  the  public  grew  to  expect  it.
Then, Friedman explained in 1968, only perpetually higher
and higher inflation surprises would produce the short-run
boost in employment. It wasn’t that the natural rate corre-
sponded to a particular rate of inflation — say, 3.5 percent.
Instead it corresponded to no change in inflation. When
unemployment was equal to its natural rate, inflation could
be expected to be relatively stable. That’s how the natural
rate of unemployment got a rather awkward nickname: the
non-accelerating  inflation  rate  of  unemployment,  or
NAIRU. 
Then in the 1970s policymakers learned painfully that
high inflation from easy monetary policies doesn’t translate
to low unemployment. Additionally, oil price spikes made
inflation a more consistent phenomenon. Rising inflation
was simply the norm, so it no longer had the beneficial effect
on  unemployment.  Stagflation,  or  simultaneously  rising
inflation and unemployment, was the result.
The Great Moderation of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s
also  challenged  conventional  thinking  about  the  Phillips
curve. The economy performed well during this period, and
both inflation and unemployment were low and stable rela-
tive  to  their  historical  averages.  When  macroeconomic
variables don’t vary much, it is harder to identify a statistical
relationship  between  them.  Here  the  Phillips  curve
appeared to be a less concrete description of the short-run
trade-off  between  inflation  and  unemployment.  A  2001
study by University of California, Los Angeles economists
Andrew Atkeson and Lee Ohanian documented that since
the  mid-1980s,  the  short-run  Phillips  curve  relationship 
had  not  been  very  stable,  and  therefore  had  limited  use 
for policymakers. 
But  the  Phillips  curve  may  redeem  itself  when  the 
variables move to extremes. It is in steep recessions that the
inflation-unemployment relationship seems strongest, argue
San  Francisco  Fed  economists  Zheng  Liu  and  Glenn
Rudebusch  in  a  January  2010  analysis.  That  implies  the
Phillips curve relationship, though inconclusive, could be a
useful  tool  for  monetary  policy  as  the  economy  recovers
from the recent severe recession. If the natural rate has not
risen from its pre-recession level of about 5 percent, then
unemployment is currently much too high, and this could
potentially  be  addressed  by  sustained  accommodative 
monetary policy. But if the natural rate has risen, then the
point at which accommodative monetary policy becomes
inflationary should occur sooner.
Prospects for a Jobless Recovery
That means economists have to turn to the difficult task of
gauging  whether  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment  has
changed, and if so, by how much. This depends on the labor
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their magnitude, and how permanent they are likely to be.
No two recessions are alike in this regard. In recessions
immediately  following World War  II,  up  through  that  of 
the  early  1980s,  the  economy  experienced  a  sharp  boost 
in employment soon after each recession’s trough. But the
more recent recessions of 1990-91 and 2001 were character-
ized as jobless recoveries with sluggish or nonexistent job
growth even as GDP recovered. 
At first blush the recession that began in 2007 shares
labor  market  characteristics  of  both  modern  and  older
recessions, according to New York Fed economist Aysegul
Sahin. Two important factors contribute to an increase in
the unemployment rate: how many workers lose their jobs
and flow into unemployment, and how many find new ones
and flow out of unemployment. The recent recession began
with a large number of layoffs, causing an increase in inflows
into  unemployment  like  the  also-steep  recessions  of  the
1970s and 1980s. In addition, even after layoffs subsided,
unemployed  workers  continued  to  have  difficulty  finding
new  jobs,  causing  a  drop  in  outflows,  similar  to  the 
recessions of the early 1990s and 2001. As a result, the unem-
ployment rate more than doubled from 5 percent at the start
of the recession in December 2007 to a high of 10.1 percent
in October 2009, and still remains at elevated levels.
So which employment recovery will the current recession
resemble? As with all recessions, inflow rates have receded
as the economy has begun to pull out of the recession, so the
mystery is how outflow rates will behave going forward. 
Outflows depend on two factors: job creation and the
labor market’s ability to match job seekers with openings.
Job creation should be relatively swift if much of unemploy-
ment is cyclical — that is, a result of the business cycle —
writes  Chicago  Fed  economist  Ellen  Rissman  in  a  2009
study. Laid-off workers can simply be called back to work
when  demand  for  goods  and  services  picks  back  up.  But
unemployment resulting from structural realignment — in
which some industries decrease in size for good — tends to
hang on longer. Affected employees must find new indus-
tries, which in some cases will mean moving to new locations
or acquiring new job skills. 
It’s not clear how much of the current unemployment
rate  comes  from  structural  realignment.  Some  industries
have been hit harder than others in the recent recession,
most notably those that expanded as a result of the housing
and lending boom. The so-called FIRE sector — finance,
insurance, and real estate — as well as construction, have all
declined more than employment as a whole. Total nonfarm
employment has contracted by more than 5 percent since
the recession’s start, while the FIRE sector has lost more
than 6 percent of its jobs. In construction, over 25 percent of
jobs have been eliminated. 
Much of the unemployment within construction and the
FIRE  sector  is  indeed  being  caused  by  large  structural 
reallocations, according to Rissman. But so far structural
realignment was not adding much to the economy’s overall
unemployment rate, she found in her 2009 study. Economist
Rob Valletta and analyst Aisling Cleary of the San Francisco
Fed also examined the role of sectoral imbalances in late
2008. Based on updated analyses using data through the end
of  2009,  Valletta  reports  that  labor  demand  imbalances
across industries — which require a reallocation of workers
— did not appear to be adding much to overall unemploy-
ment.  In  fact,  they  found  the  imbalances  had  begun  to
dissipate in the second half of 2009. Their findings imply
that the increase in unemployment during 2008-2009 was
primarily cyclical rather than structural. 
One possible explanation for this is that the sectors econ-
omists think might be permanently shrinking represent a
relatively  small  component  of  total  employment.
Manufacturing, for example, was about 10 percent of total
nonfarm employment before the recession and also was hit
hard during the downturn. Though the hit to construction
has been severe, the sector constituted just 5.4 percent of
total employment going into the recession 
But the nature of layoffs may provide some evidence of
structural realignment. “Starting from the 1990s, firms’ use
of temporary layoffs declined a lot. As a result only a tiny
fraction  of  unemployed  people  today  are  on  temporary 
layoff,” Sahin says. A job’s permanent eradication may be a
harbinger of a permanent shift away from that industry.
Even  if  permanent  layoffs  don’t  reflect  a  structural
realignment,  they  can  still  hint  at  a  slower  employment
recovery. “Temporary layoffs are very easy to reverse because
you basically have the desk, the computer, and now you just
call the worker back,” Sahin says. “It’s much cheaper than
actually  setting  up  a  new  position  and  investing  in  the 
capital and posting a vacancy.” 
To the extent that a worker’s old job has permanently
gone away, re-employment will have to come from new job
creation. Once demand starts to pick up, firms still may be
hesitant to hire until they are sure to be out of the woods
economically — especially if they can tap into other means
of producing more with the same number of workers in the
meantime. Some firms may increase the number of hours
their current employees work without hiring new workers,
or they call on temp workers when possible. “They can just
push the existing workers even more because the quit rate is
very low,” Sahin says. “Less people produce more as a result.
In those recessions productivity increases a lot.” 
This  seems  to  be  the  case  now,  since  productivity 
has  stayed  strong  in  this  recession.  In  the  2001  recession 
productivity  growth  never  dropped  below  2  percent,  note
Cleveland Fed economists Paul Bauer and Michael Shenk. So
far in this recession productivity growth dropped to a low of
1.4 percent before surging well above 5 percent at the end of
2009.  Historically,  productivity  growth  would  fall  or  even
turn negative in recessions. Most economists point to “labor
hoarding,” in which firms hang on to workers through the
recession so as to not lose good workers familiar with their
production.  In  the  recent  recession,  productivity  coming
from more intense use of capital has increased even though
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ing ways to produce more with the same number of workers. 
Regardless  of  how  many  jobs  are  created,  the  labor 
market’s efficiency at matching available workers to jobs has
gone down in this recession, Sahin says, which puts a crimp
in  employment  recovery.  There  are  several  explanations
behind this lower match efficiency. Workers’ skills may not
sync well to the jobs opening up, especially if the jobs are in
new industries. “It could be that lots of people lost manufac-
turing jobs and there are many jobs in the health sector, but
they are not good matches so they need retraining,” Sahin
says. Rissman suggests that workers in the FIRE sector, for
instance, may have skills that are more easily transferable to
other industries whereas workers in construction have skills
that are not as easily adaptable. Also, those who have been
unemployed for long durations can experience skill depreci-
ation. And even if a worker’s marketable skills are still largely
intact, long spells of unemployment may appear as a nega-
tive signal to would-be employers.
The weak housing market may also limit the ability or
willingness of some unemployed to relocate to new jobs. It’s
not clear how quantitatively important this effect could be,
but it could be geographically concentrated in areas that are
economically  struggling  and  have  weak  housing  markets.
Economists Fernando Ferreira and Joseph Gyourko of the
University  of  Pennsylvania  and  Joseph Tracy  of  the  New
York Fed found in a 2009 study that negative equity in one’s
home reduced mobility of affected households between 1985
and 2007, making them one-third less mobile on average.
Their results do not cover the current housing downturn,
but their evidence would be consistent with the most recent
U.S. Census estimates that the “mover rate” — a measure
that  captures  the  mobility  of  households  —  fell  in  2008 
to  the  lowest  level  since  the  data  were  first  collected  in 
1948. The proportion of movers who have stayed within the
same  county  has  spiked,  while  the  proportion  who  have
moved  out  of  state  has  fallen  to  the  lowest  level  since 
the mid-1990s.
The federal government’s expansion of unemployment
benefits also could temporarily reduce the labor market’s
match efficiency. More generous unemployment insurance
(UI) regimes have been known to contribute to unemploy-
ment for two reasons: Workers receiving UI can be more
selective about the job they choose to take, and some unem-
ployed workers who otherwise may have stopped looking for
jobs (and therefore would no longer be included in unem-
R e g i o n   F o c u s   |   Fi r s t   Q u a r t e r   |   2 0 1 0   15
“[M]any  of  the  market  characteristics  that  determine
[the level of the natural rate of unemployment] are man-
made and policy-made,” Milton Friedman said in 1968. But
one of the most important determinants of the natural rate
of unemployment is entirely out of the control of policy-
makers:  the  composition  of  the  labor  force.  Changes  in
demographics, particularly concerning the average age of
workers, account for the bulk of the shifts in the natural
rate over time. Younger workers are more likely to change
jobs  than  middle-aged  people  who  have  a  mortgage 
and  other  responsibilities,  and  they  are  more  prone  to
unemployment. 
Thus,  the  biggest  contribution  that  demographics
makes  to  the  natural  rate  is  the  proportion  of  the  work
force aged 25 or less. It is easy to understand why when you
look  at  unemployment  rates  by  age  group.  Before  the 
recession, the 16-19 age group had an average unemploy-
ment  rate  in  excess  of  15  percent,  compared  with  about   
8 percent for 20- to 24-year-olds, and well under 4 percent
for workers aged 25 and above. 
This  explains  why  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment
rose  in  the  1980s,  when  a  large  crop  of  baby  boomers
entered  the  labor  market. Then  in  the  1990s,  after  that
major component of the labor force had aged some, the 
natural  rate  fell.  Now  many  baby  boomers  are  retiring, 
lowering the average age of labor force participants. 
Nobel laureate Edmund Phelps of Columbia University
says  it  is  the  policy  response  to  retiring  baby  boomers 
that could most affect the natural rate. “I’ve been bracing
for  a  rise  in  the  natural  rate  for  a  long  time  on  the 
thinking that as we get nearer to 2020, when spending for 
Social Security, retirement pensions, and Medicare and so
forth reaches full force, markets will start to factor that 
in  and  that  will  mean  expectations  of  higher  tax  rates 
sooner or later to pay for those entitlements.” That should
depress  business  asset  values,  reducing  the  return  to 
capital  investment  and  innovation,  he  says. That  slower
innovation could set a new higher floor for the natural rate
of unemployment.
— RENEE COURTOIS
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NOTE: Shaded areas correspond to recessions.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statisticsployed numbers) may keep searching to continue receiving
benefits. But this effect is not likely to be large or persistent.
“Even with the temporary increase in generosity, benefits
are still pretty stingy by the standards of other advanced
economies,”  says  economist  Larry  Ball  of  Johns  Hopkins
University. “This is not only temporary but, even while it
lasts,  a  pretty  small  step  in  the  direction  of  the  welfare
state.”  Sahin adds, “People expect benefits to go down as the
economy recovers.”
Is High Unemployment the New Normal?
While it is relatively easy to lay out the risk factors that
could point to a jobless recovery, it is highly uncertain how
important each of these factors might be. “We believe there
are temporary factors that are causing the unemployment
rate to be higher than suggested by the stable relationships
in  the  U.S.  economy,”  Sahin  says,  summarizing  a  recent
analysis of the behavior of employment in the recent reces-
sion with coauthors Bart Hobijn and Michael Elsby, of the
San Francisco Fed and the University of Michigan, respec-
tively. These factors could contribute to the risk of a jobless
recovery, she says. But there is good news: The U.S. labor
market is exceptionally dynamic and flexible, which might
help it work through these temporary issues faster.
Would  a  slow  employment  recovery  mean  the  natural
rate of unemployment has risen too? That is a much trickier
issue  than  simply  deriving  an  outlook  for  employment.
Economists think of the natural rate of unemployment as a
function  of  structural  and  permanent  features  of  the 
economy. That  said,  the  difference  between  a  shock  that
takes a long time to work through and a rise in the natural
rate is, to a degree, a matter of semantics. “There’s not a
clear  distinction  between  what’s  really  permanent  and 
what just takes a long time,” Ball says. “One way to think
about a change in the natural rate is something that lasts
substantially beyond two or three years.” 
The outlook for the natural rate and actual unemploy-
ment  will  also  depend  on  prospects  for  the  economy’s
future. Though a theoretical premise of the natural rate of
unemployment  is  that  demand  doesn’t  affect  the  level  of
employment in the long run, Phelps says, “that’s not to say
that the structureof demand doesn’t matter.” In particular, he
says, investment demand has a large impact on the natural
rate. “I think you’re going to have an overhang of people
whose careers were tied to investment-like activities who are
not going to get picked up again for employment unless, and
until,  there’s  a  revival  of  business  investment  and  more 
generally of forward-looking projects in companies.” 
Though economists can’t with certainty pin a number to
the changing natural rate in real time, Phelps ventures what
he admits is a rough estimate: “I think the new normal is
somewhere between six and a half and eight percent,” he
says, an estimate which ranges from “very rosy” to “maybe a
little too pessimistic.”
One could also try to pin down the natural rate in terms
of the Phillips curve — that is, in terms of what’s simultane-
ously happening with inflation. “It seems very unlikely that
we’re going to be back down to five percent unemployment
or very close to that in the next five years,” says Ball, “and
inflation  seems  very  stable.  And  the  definition  of  the
NAIRU is the unemployment rate consistent with stable
inflation,” he reminds. “So if we see unemployment staying
well  above  five  percent  without  inflation  continuously
falling, then by definition the NAIRU has risen.” That is, he
adds, if our basic model of the Phillips curve is right.  RF
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